We show that the waterbed e¤ect, i.e. the pass-through of a change in one price of a …rm to its other prices, is much stronger if the latter include subscription rather than only usage fees. In particular, in mobile network competition with a …xed number of customers, the waterbed e¤ect is full under two-part tari¤s, while it is only partial under linear tari¤s.
Introduction
The "waterbed e¤ect" describes the interdependence between prices at multiplegood …rms and multi-sided platforms. As much as a waterbed rises on one side if it is pressed down on the other, …rms may optimally change prices if some other price is forced to a di¤erent level, for example through regulatory interventions. The extent of the waterbed e¤ect can be a contentious issue when it would weaken the e¤ectiveness of the regulatory measures. In the debate about the downward regulation of the charges paid by …xed networks to mobile networks for routing calls from the former to their receivers on the latter, the so-called "mobile termination rates", mobile networks have claimed that the result would be higher retail prices for mobile customers, while regulators argued there would be no e¤ect. 1 Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal; email: shoernig@novasbe.pt. 1 See Schi¤ (2008) for an introduction to the waterbed e¤ect and a discussion of these issues.
In this note we show how the waterbed e¤ect depends on the type of tari¤ that is charged to the unregulated side of the market. On the regulated side, the …rm receives a …xed payment per customer of the unregulated side. This payment can be the pro…ts from …xed-to-mobile termination of calls, or advertising, or any other pro…ts that depend on the customer's existence (rather than his usage). We determine the pass-through for two-part tari¤s, where customers pay for subscription and usage, and for linear tari¤s where they only pay for usage. 2 We show that the waterbed e¤ect is much stronger under two-part than under linear tari¤s; in particular, under the assumption of a …xed number of mobile subscribers we show that under two-part tari¤s the waterbed e¤ect is full, while it is only partial with linear tari¤s. This implies that downward regulation of some price leads to a stronger rise negative e¤ect on clients of the other services if the latter are charged a multipart tari¤. In particular, this result contracts mobile networks' contention that lower …xed-to-mobile termination rates would disproportionately hurt customers on pre-pay tari¤s.
The issue of the strength of the waterbed e¤ect has been studied in both in theoretical and empirical work. Wright (2002) remains the most important theoretical treatment of …xed-to-mobile interconnection. He shows, generically, that if the pass-through of …xed costs to pro…ts is full (partial), networks are indi¤erent about termination rates (jointly want to set them at the monopoly level). Below we show that these cases arise due to competition in two-part or linear tari¤s, respectively. 3 Genakos and Valletti (2011a, 2011b) provide an empirical study of the waterbed e¤ect with simultaneous …xed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile interconnection. They show that the waterbed e¤ect is signi…cantly stronger for post-pay (two-part) than for pre-pay (linear) tari¤s. They ascribe this di¤erence to how the regulation of mobile termination rates a¤ects the interconnection of calls between mobile networks, and therefore indirectly changes how intensively networks compete for subscribers. While their argument is certainly correct, it is does not take into account that the actual direct passthrough of …xed-to-mobile termination pro…ts depends on the type of tari¤s in the mobile market. In this note, we isolate this factor by considering the two types of termination separately.
Model Setup
The model setup is a generalization of La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998) to many networks and general (instead of Hotelling) subscription demand. We assume that there are n 2 symmetric mobile networks i = 1; :::; n who compete in tari¤s. In the main text we consider linear and two-part tari¤s that do not discriminate between calls within the same network (on-net calls) and those to rival networks (o¤-net calls), while in the appendix we analyze tari¤s which price discriminate between these types of calls. Thus for now we assume that network i charges a price p i for each call minute. In case networks compete in two-part tari¤s it also charges a …xed fee F i .
The marginal on-net cost of a call is c > 0 and the cost of terminating a call is c 0 > 0. Networks charge each other the access charge a per incoming call minute. Thus the marginal cost of an o¤-net call is c+m, where m = a c 0 is the termination margin. There is a monthly …xed cost f per customer, and networks receive further monthly pro…ts of Q per customer that do not originate from payments for retail services o¤ered to them. Our focus will be on how equilibrium pro…ts depend on Q.
From making a call of length q, a consumer obtains utility u(q), where u(0) = 0, u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0. For call price p, the indirect utility is
. Receiving a call of length q yields utility u(q), where 0 indicates the strength of the call externality. Letting v i = v(p i ) and assuming a balanced calling pattern (i.e. subscribers call any other subscriber with the same probability) the surplus of a consumer on network i is given by
where F i is zero for a linear tari¤. The market share of network i = 1; :::; n is assumed to be i = A (w i w 1 ; :::; w i w n ) ; where A n : R n ! R is strictly increasing and symmetric in its arguments, with 0 i 1, P n i=1 i = 1, from which follows that A(0; :::; 0) = 1=n. Let = dA (x; 0; :::; 0) =dxj x=0 . 4 Denote the pro…ts from a pair of originated and terminated calls between networks i and j as P ij = (p i c m)q i + mq j , i; j = 1; :::; n (access payments cancel for on-net calls). Network i's pro…ts are
3 Equilibrium Pro…ts and the Waterbed Effect
We will now derive equilibrium pro…ts and determine their dependence on pro…ts Q, for both linear and two-part tari¤s. As for the latter, network i's …rst-order condition for a pro…t maximum is
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium we have i = 1=n, @ i =@F i = (n 1) , and for all j 6 = i, @ j =@F i = and P ij = P ii . Solving the …rst-order condition for i we obtain
These pro…ts do not depend on Q, i.e. we have a full waterbed e¤ect. As for linear tari¤s, consider the …rst-order condition for maximizing pro…ts with respect to the call price p i :
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, we have p i = p and q i = q for all i = 1; :::; n, and thus @ i =@p i = (n 1) q and @ j =@p i = q , with
where L = (p c (n 1) m=n) =p is the Lerner index for the equilibrium call price and the corresponding price elasticity of demand. Combining both expressions for pro…ts shows that even in our more general framework under two-part tari¤s the call price continues equal to average cost, i.e. L = 0 or p = c + (n 1) m=n, i.e. does not depend on Q at all. On the other hand, we now need to determine @p =@Q for linear tari¤s, for which we combine (2) with the symmetric equilibrium pro…ts i = (P f + Q) =n, P = (p c) q , to obtain dp dQ
where apostrophes denote derivatives with respect to p . Since p is below the monopoly price (P ) 0 is strictly positive, and the denominator is positive unless the demand elasticity decreases very strongly as the call price increases. The following assumption, common in the economic literature, provides a simple su¢ cient condition for ( L ) 0 > 0. Assumption 1: The price elasticity of demand (:) is non-decreasing. Under this assumption, we conclude that under linear tari¤s higher Q feeds through to lower call prices, dp =dQ < 0. Finally, we obtain
which implies that only by chance the waterbed e¤ect is full (d(n i )=dQ = 0). Under Assumption 1, we obtain 0 < d (n i ) =dQ < 1, i.e. higher Q is translated into higher industry pro…ts, but only partially so. As shown in the Appendix, much the same results hold if networks price discriminate between on-and o¤-net calls, as originally discussed in Hoernig (2010) .
Two conclusions follow from these results: First, in general terms the exact structure of tari¤s on one side of a market dictates how price changes on some other side are transmitted, even though di¤erent groups of customers are involved. Thus the design of regulation must take types of tari¤s in unregulated market segments into account. Second, for the speci…c case of regulation of …xed-to-mobile termination charges, our results show that concerns about reduced consumer welfare due to the waterbed e¤ect are less justi…ed for consumers on pre-pay (linear) tari¤s than those on post-pay (two-part) tari¤s, contrary to what networks have often publicly claimed. 5 If Assumption 1 were to be strongly violated then industry pro…t would even decrease in Q. Firms'lobbying for higher Q shows that this case is merely a theoretical curiosity.
any other subscriber with the same probability) the surplus of a consumer on network i is given by
where h ii = v i + u i and h ij =v i + û j for j 6 = i, and F i is equal to zero under a linear tari¤. Denote the pro…ts from one on-net call as P ii = (p ii c)q ii and those of a pair of outgoing and incoming o¤-net calls as P ij = (p i c m)q i + mq j , j 6 = i. Network i's pro…ts are
Letting h be the n n-matrix of h ij , and w and F the n 1-vectors of w i and F i , we can write w = h F . Write market shares as i = D i (w) and = D(h F ) for a function D : R n ! R n with Jacobian W , then we obtain the market share derivatives
d dp = W h d dp + dh dp () d dp = G dh dp ;
where I is the identity matrix and G = (I W h) 1 W , with elements G ij , i; j = 1; :::; n. For the derivatives with respect to …xed fees, we obtain
As for call prices, note …rst that dh=dp i is an n n-matrix with entry dh ii =p i = q i + u 0 (p i )q 0 i = q i (1 + i ) at position (i; i) and zeros otherwise; similarly, for j 6 = i the matrix dh=dp i has entries dh ij =dp i = q i and dh ji =dp i = q i ^ i , and is otherwise equal to zero. As a result, we have, for j = 1; :::; n,
Since market shares sum to 1, we have W ii + P j6 =i W ij = 0 for all i. This implies P k6 =i G jk = G ji , 6 and thus
In a symmetric equilibrium, W ij = for all i and j 6 = i, and thus W ii = (n 1) . Furthermore, in symmetric equilibrium all h ii h on are identical, and so are all h ij h of , for j 6 = i. After some computations, we …nd
First we determine the equilibrium pro…ts under multi-part tari¤s, following Hoernig (2014): The …rst-order condition for pro…t-maximization with respect to …xed fees is
which can be solved for the symmetric equilibrium pro…ts ( i = 1=n,
As is known (e.g. Hoernig 2014), 7 under multi-part tari¤s with price discrimination between on-and o¤-net calls the equilibrium call prices are p mp = c=(1 + ) andp mp = (c + m) = (1 = (n 1)). Call prices and h on , h of , P mp of and P mp on do not depend on Q. As a result, equilibrium pro…ts under multi-part tari¤s are independent of Q, and the waterbed e¤ect is full.
As for linear tari¤s, the …rst-order condition for the pro…t-maximizing on-net price at the symmetric equilibrium is
with pro…ts under linear tari¤s of
and on-net Lerner index L on = (p c) =p. Equally, by using the …rst-order condition for the pro…t-maximizing o¤-net price we obtain 0 = @ i @p i = d i dp i i i + i n X j=1 d j dp i P ij + X j6 =i j dP ij dp i ! ; or, with L of = (p c m) =p,
Equating lt on to lt of , we obtain
This result implies that the Lerner indices tend L on and L of tend to move in lockstep, that is, if higher Q leads to a lower on-net price then the o¤-net price will decrease as well. While the exact comparative statics are too involved to be discussed here, this implies that changes in Q are not compensated by opposing shifts in on-and o¤-net call prices. If call externalities and access margins are small ( ; m 0), then the equilibrium condition impliesp p, and similar computations as in the main text lead to i.e. the above result for the waterbed e¤ect under linear tari¤s continues to hold approximately even under discrimination between on-and o¤-net prices.
